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I.

INTRODUCTION

strip'-that darling of mathematicians and amateur
The M6bius
magicians-is a conceit that captures the twist caused when state action doctrine

of a half-century ago intersects with modern so-called defense of marriage
amendments ("DOMAs").2 Mathematicians define a Mobius strip as a chiral
3
surface with only one side and one edge. In lay terms, it is the product of taking
a narrow paper strip, giving it a half-twist in the middle, and then fixing the ends
together to form one continuous loop. Features of the Mobius strip make it an
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School;
B.A., M.A., Oxford University; B.A., Anderson University. Thanks to James Brudney, Chris Bryant,
Ruth Colker, Emily Houh, Marc Spindelman, Mark Strasser, and Verna Williams for comments and
suggestions for this Essay. Thanks also to the Schott Fund and the University of Cincinnati College of
Law, which provided financial support for this project.
1. See infra Appendix Figure A for an example of a MObius strip. See generally The MObius
Strip, http://www.math.hmc.edu/-gu/curvesand_surfaces/surfaces/moebius.html (last visited May 29,
2009).
2. 1 refer to these amendments as DOMAs throughout this Essay for the sake of convenience
and because they are called such in many jurisdictions. By doing so, I do not intend to signal
agreement with DOMAs' advocates or suggest in any way that DOMA is a politically neutral term.
Additionally, when I refer to DOMAs, I refer exclusively to state defense of marriage amendments,
not to the federal Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1
U.S.C. § 7 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006)).
3. Clifford A. Pickover, THE MOBIUS STRIP 8 (2006); Isaac M. McPhee, The Mobius Strip:
2008,
12,
Apr.
SUITE101.cOM,
Paradox,
a
Mathematical
of
Topology
http://mathchaostheory.suitell.com/article.cfm/making-the-mathematical-wonder-kno.
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appropriate metaphor for the bending of state action doctrine by state DOMAs.
4
One feature is that the Mobius strip is, in mathematical parlance, nonorientable.
That is, it has neither a front nor a back, and only by tearing the strip can it be
made to have a front or back. The other feature is that one can trace a line from
a single point on the surface of the Mobius strip along the length of its contours
and end up on the flip side of the strip at the starting point, all without picking
up the pencil.
Like the magician's paper band, Shelley v. Kraemer,5 the Supreme Court's
sixty-year-old landmark case on state action, can be twisted into a Mobius strip.
First, take the core holding of Shelley: a state court that enforces a private
racially restrictive covenant is a state actor for purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Then give Shelley's state action doctrine a half-twist of state
constitutionalism: over half of the states have amended their constitutions to
forbid marriage between same-sex couples; approximately a dozen of these
states forbid even state recognition of legal relationships that are intended to or
do confer marriage-like benefits to same-sex couples. 6 So, now Shelley's state
action principle-state judicial enforcement of racially discriminatory private
agreements is state action that violates the Fourteenth Amendment-can be
4. McPhee, supra note 3.
5. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
6. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 36.03(g) ("A union replicating marriage of or between persons
of the same sex in the State of Alabama or in any other jurisdiction shall be considered and treated in
all respects as having no legal force or effect in this state and shall not be recognized by this state as a
marriage or other union replicating marriage."); GA. CONST. art. I, § 4, 1 I(b) ("No union between
persons of the same sex shall be recognized by this state as entitled to the benefits of marriage. This
state shall not give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other state or
jurisdiction respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage
under the laws of such other state or jurisdiction. The courts of this state shall have no jurisdiction to
grant a divorce or separate maintenance with respect to any such relationship or otherwise to consider
or rule on any of the parties' respective rights arising as a result of or in connection with such
relationship."); KAN. CONST. art. 15, § 16(b) ("No relationship, other than a marriage, shall be
recognized by the state as entitling the parties to the rights or incidents of marriage."); KY. CONST. §
233A ("Only a marriage between one man and one woman shall be valid or recognized as a marriage
in Kentucky. A legal status identical or substantially similar to that of marriage for unmarried
individuals shall not be valid or recognized."); LA. CONST. art. 12, § 15 ("Marriage in the state.., shall
consist only of the union of one man and one woman. No official or court of the state of Louisiana
shall construe this constitution or any state law to require that marriage or the legal incidents thereof
be conferred upon any member of a union other than the union of one man and one woman. A legal
status identical or substantially similar to that of marriage for unmarried individuals shall not be valid
or recognized. No official or court of the state of Louisiana shall recognize any marriage contracted in
any other jurisdiction which is not the union of one man and one woman."); VA. CONST. art. I. § 15-A
("That only a union between one man and one woman may be a marriage valid in or recognized by
this Commonwealth and its political subdivisions. This Commonwealth and its political subdivisions
shall not create or recognize a legal status for relationships of unmarried individuals that intends to
approximate the design, qualities, significance, or effects of marriage. Nor shall this Commonwealth or
its political subdivisions create or recognize another union, partnership, or other legal status to which
is assigned the rights, benefits, obligations, qualities, or effects of marriage."). Of course, the
counterpoint to these amendments is the success of marriage equality movements in the New England
states, which recently have successfully lobbied for same-sex marriage in the Maine, New Hampshire,
and Vermont legislatures.
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turned by state courts into a rule that forbids state judicial enforcement of
private agreements between same-sex couples because such enforcement is
"state action" 7 that violates DOMA.
Then, reseal the strip at the end, and you discover the flip side of Shelley. In
Romer v. Evans8 the Supreme Court held that a state constitutional amendment
that denied homosexuals legal redress available to everyone else is a form of
discriminatory state action forbidden by equal protection. In the words of Justice
Kennedy, "[a] law declaring that ... it shall be more difficult for one group of
citizens than for all others to seek aid from the government is ...

a denial of

equal protection of the laws in the most literal sense." 9 Therefore, a state cannot
deny gays and lesbians the benefit of general laws of private contract that are
0
enforceable by every other person.'
Now we have a Mdbius strip. Shelley begins with a general legal
proposition: state judicial officers are state actors for purposes of the federal
constitution; they cannot enforce certain private agreements when doing so
contravenes equal protection. Then we come to the state constitutional twist:
state judicial officers are state actors for purposes of the state constitution; they
cannot enforce private agreements when doing so contravenes state
constitutional imperatives like DOMA. Then, with Romer, we get to the flip side
of Shelley: state judicial officers are state actors for purposes of the federal
constitution; they cannot refuse to enforce private agreements when doing so
contravenes equal protection. As explored below, the resulting doctrinal
contortion is at once a testament to the law of unintended consequences, a
cautionary tale about state experimentalism, and a comment on the aspiration
and limits of neutral principles of adjudication.
In using the trope of the Mobius strip, I do not suggest that law, fraught
with human frailty, can be reduced to a set of mathematical principles.t Instead,
this Essay is an exercise in what the Russian formalists called ostranenie: to
"make strange" or "defamiliarize" that which has become routine or habitual in
order to better understand its nature. 12 Or, as Professor Tribe puts it, a
7. In this sense I use "state action" not as a term of art in federal Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence, but more broadly to indicate when any action can be attributed to the state for
purposes of state constitutional law.
8. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
9. Romer, 517 U.S. at 633.
10. 1 concede that my application of Romer to state DOMAs is complicated by the fact that
several state DOMAs are written so broadly as to sweep in any unmarried relationship, including
heterosexual relationships. However, such a construction that would stretch a state DOMA to
agreements between unmarried heterosexual couples may simply make the resulting broad application
of DOMA even more irrational.
11. See Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn
from Modern Physics, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1989) (counseling caution when using mathematics
to explain legal precepts).
12. Viktor Shklovsky, Art as Technique, in CONTEMPORARY LITERARY CRITICISM: MODERNISM
THROUGH POST-STRUCTURALISM 52, 55 (Robert Con Davis ed., 1986); see also Nouri Gana, Beyond
the Pale: Toward an Exemplary Relationship Between the Judge and the Literary Critic, 15 LAW &
LITERATURE 313,323 (2003) (discussing writers' need to defamiliarize routine).
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mathematical metaphor "brings greater awareness of [our] preconceptions" in
legal analysis and "creates the possibility of choice and intellectual progress."' 3
The piece progresses as follows: Part II briefly summarizes the Shelley
decision and its impact on state action doctrine. Part III discusses Shelley's role
in sparking debates about neutral principles of adjudication. It simultaneously
explores how state courts have used Shelley and related federal cases to resolve
state action questions posed by their own state constitutions. Part IV discusses
the history of state DOMAs, the breadth of some of their provisions, and how
courts have interpreted some of their terms. In doing so, this Part explains how
Shelley is a necessary conceptual antecedent for state court application of
DOMAs to private agreements that benefit same-sex couples. It also suggests
that Shelley's state action principle, when twisted by state DOMAs, is a latent
threat to judicial enforcement of private ordering between same-sex couples.
Part V closes the Mbbius loop, discussing how state court invalidation of private
agreements between same-sex couples under DOMA could itself violate federal
equal protection guarantees after Romer v. Evans. Part VI distills from this
process of ostranenie three lessons respecting neutral principles, constitutional
avoidance, and the risks of state constitutional experimentalism.
II.

SHELLEY V. KRAEMER AND STATE ACTION

State action is the key that unlocks the keep of equal protection
jurisprudence. The Civil Rights Cases,14 now over one hundred twenty-five years
old, limited the Fourteenth Amendment's remedial targets to government actors,
15
not purely private ones.

13. Tribe, supra note 11, at 3. Moreover, to the extent that the Supreme Court of the United
States has already allowed mathematical metaphors such as "congruence" and "proportionality" to
creep into its constitutional lexicon, my approach is not all that idiosyncratic. See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla.
Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 82-83 (2000) (holding that requirements that Age Discrimination in
Employment Act places on states are not congruent and proportional to constitutional violations it
seeks to prevent); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) (noting that congressional
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement authority must be "congruen[t]" and "proportional[]" to
potential injury to be prevented or remedied).
14. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). The Civil Rights Act of 1875 required "full and equal enjoyment of the
accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or water,
theaters, and other places of public amusement" regardless of color, and provided for civil and
criminal penalties for its violation. Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335, 336. The Civil Rights
Cases invalidated civil and criminal actions against individuals who had discriminated against blacks in
violation of the Act. 109 U.S. at 3-4. The Civil Rights Cases remain good law and are still cited for the
proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment requires state action. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598, 621-22 (2000) (emphasizing continued strength of decision in Civil Rights Cases and
citing recent applications).
15. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 17 ("[C]ivil rights, such as are guaranteed by the Constitution
against State aggression, cannot be impaired by the wrongful acts of individuals, unsupported by State
authority in the shape of laws, customs, or judicial or executive proceedings. The wrongful act of an
individual, unsupported by any such authority, is simply a private wrong .... ).
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Before Shelley v. Kraemer,t 6 courts had narrowly circumscribed the types of
activity that qualified as "state action." 17 Legislation was certainly state action, as
was exercise of executive power. But a wide swath of government and
government-sanctioned behavior lay outside the boundaries of state action
doctrine. Shelley represented a substantial expansion, if not the apogee, of the
sphere of government activity that fell within the "state action" rubric.
Shelley consolidated two cases, one arising from the Missouri Supreme
Court, the other from the Michigan Supreme Court. In both, white landowners
asked the state courts to enjoin African-American families who wanted to
occupy homes that were subject to racially restrictive covenants. 18 The buyers
appealed through the state systems to the United States Supreme Court. In a
unanimous decision, with three Justices abstaining, 19 the Court held that state
court enforcement of private racially restrictive covenants violated the Equal
20
Protection Clause of the federal Constitution.
The Court stated, "state action in violation of the [Fourteenth]
Amendment's provisions is equally repugnant . . . whether directed by state

statute or taken by a judicial official in the absence of statute. '21 The fact that
the state courts of Missouri and Michigan had enforced a "pattern of
discrimination . . . defined initially by the terms of a private agreement" was
inconsequential. 22 "State action . . . refers to exertions of state power in all

23
forms," including the judicial power.
As Wendell Pritchett has observed, the Court did not declare that racially
restrictive agreements themselves were illegal. 24 Instead, the Court took a
superficially more restrained approach. The agreements could be honored if

16. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
17. Cf. Diana Hassel, Living a Lie: The Cost of Qualified Immunity, 64 Mo. L. REV. 123, 125 n.9

(1999) (discussing narrowness of "state action" doctrine before the early 1960s).
18. In the Missouri case, the restrictive language operated upon "any person not of the Caucasian
race" and specifically against "people of the Negro or Mongolian Race." Shelley, 334 U.S. at 5. In the
Michigan case, the covenant restricted use or occupancy to "any person or persons except those of the
Caucasian race." Id. at 6.
19. Justices Reed, Jackson, and Rutledge took no part in the decision. Id. at 23.
20. Id. at 20-21.
21. Id. at 16.
22. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 20.
23. Id.
24. Wendell E. Pritchett, Shelley v. Kraemer: Racial Liberalism and the U.S. Supreme Court, in

CIVIL RIGHTS STORIEs 5, 20 (Myriam E. Gilles & Risa L. Goluboff eds., 2007). The Chief Justice
would clarify his position in a later restrictive covenant case:
[Tihese racial restrictive covenants, whatever we may think of them, are not legal nullities so
far as any doctrine of federal law is concerned; it is not unlawful to make them; it is not
unlawful to enforce them unless the method by which they are enforced in some way
contravenes the Federal Constitution or a federal statute.
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 261 (1953) (Vinson, C.J., dissenting). Indeed, unlike his brethren,
Chief Justice Vinson may have permitted a suit for monetary damages against white landowners who
breached the covenant. Id. at 269.
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voluntarily followed, but they could not be enforced by the state. 25 In other
words, a group of persons may agree to exclude blacks from their neighborhood,
but no one of them can summon the coercive power of the government to punish
a member if the member chooses to breach the agreement. 26 The Equal
Protection Clause simply does not allow a landowner to enlist the state court's
help to police a private racial zoning scheme. State courts are state actors when
they enforce these private agreements.
Shelley, as Laurence Tribe has suggested, exposed the "geometry of the
state's common law," a geometry in which state judges had drawn common law
rules so that racially restrictive covenants fell to the enforceable side of the
enforceability divide, and other restraints on alienation (such as perpetuities) fell
to the nonenforceable side. 27 Before Shelley, a state judge could rest comfortably
in the belief that her decision merely arranged entitlements according to the
individual parties' predetermined wishes. After Shelley, a state judge had to
consider whether the parties' wishes, and her own choices of whether and how to
enforce those wishes, implicated the state for purposes of constitutional law.
The problem with Shelley-as noted even by those who agreed with its
result-was the potentially intolerable breadth of the reasoning. 28 If the
enforcement of a contract can trigger state action, what private agreement did
not involve state action? And if that was the case, what was the meaning of the
private/public distinction at all?
Shelley helped ignite a still-smoldering debate over the role of "neutral
principles" in constitutional adjudication. Its first spokesperson was the late
Herbert Wechsler, who in 1959 cited Shelley as among those cases that "hardest
test

. . .

my belief in principled adjudication." 29 Wechsler largely approved of

Shelley's result. But he questioned whether its reasoning could be defended on
grounds other than an "ad hoc determination[] ' 30 of its narrow issue, a
determination that "yield[s] no neutral principles for [its] extension or

25. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 31 (1948).
26. Barrows, 346 U.S. at 260; Shelley, 334 U.S. at 13, 20.

27. Tribe, supra note 11, at 25-26.
28. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REV.

473, 473 (1962) (asserting that Shelley could extend concepts of state action, enlarge sphere of federal
jurisdiction, and realign how private citizens and their government relate); Richard G. Huber,
Revolution in Private Law?, 6 S.C. L.Q. 8, 13 (1953) (predicting that "[a]reas traditionally considered

purely private will now have to be scanned for constitutional objections never before faced in those
areas"); Herbert Wechsler, Toward NeutralPrinciplesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2930 (1959) (asking rhetorically whether racially discriminatory wills or racially motivated trespassing
suits are forbidden under the equal protection clause); Donald M. Cahen, Comment, The Impact of
Shelley v. Kraemer on the State Action Concept, 44 CAL. L. REV. 718, 733 (1956) (raising question
whether "[u]nder the guise of protecting civil rights by 'strengthening' due process and the equal
protection of the laws . . . Shelley creates a means of restricting civil liberties, making possible far
greater government control of individual activity than desired").
29. Wechsler, supra note 28, at 26. The other cases that troubled Wechsler were the "white
primary" case, Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944), and the "school segregation" case, Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Wechsler, supra note 28, at 26.
30. Wechsler, supra note 28, at 31.
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support. ' 31 To Wechsler, Shelley suffered from the lack of "criteria that can be
framed and tested as an exercise of reason and not merely as an act of willfulness
or will."' 32 Shelley seemed to betoken a Court acting as a "naked power organ"
rather than as a "court[] of law."' 33 According to Wechsler, courts should strive to
"rest[] [their decisions] on reasons with respect to all the issues in the case,
reasons that in their generality and their neutrality transcend any immediate
' 34
result that is involved.
But contrary to Wechsler's criticism, Chief Justice Vinson's reliance on the
Fourteenth Amendment was in fact a faltering attempt to fashion the type of
neutral principle that Wechsler championed. 35 In this sense, Wechsler failed to
grasp that a seemingly more active-but jurisprudentially defensible-decision
in Shelley would have been to rule that private racially restrictive covenants are
themselves illegal because they violate the Civil Rights Act of 1866.36
Instead of directly striking down agreements themselves, the Justices
attempted to background the private agreements by characterizing the
constitutional issue as one of enforceability rather than legality. But by doing so,
they brought into relief a set of underlying questions about state action, the
public/private distinction, and neutral principles.
These questions remain largely unanswered. 37 It has been sixty years since
Shelley and the Supreme Court still has not clarified its scope. 38 Consequently,

31. Id.
32. Id. at 11.
33. Id. at 19.
34. Id. Wechsler's canonical piece, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, where he
explored these reservations, has been variously embraced, modified, criticized, and derided by dozens
of scholars over the past half-century. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Neutral Principles:A Retrospective, 50
VAND. L. REV. 503, 513 (1997) (noting that Wechsler conceded difficulty of deciding Brown based on
neutral principles); Robert C. Post & Neil S. Siegel, Theorizing the Law/Politics Distinction: Neutral
Principles,Affirmative Action, and the Enduring Legacy of Paul Mishkin, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1473, 147477 (2007) (examining conflict between Wechsler's neutrality principle and other important social
ideals); Martin Shapiro, The Supreme Court and ConstitutionalAdjudication: Of Politics and Neutral
Principles, 31 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 587, 605-06 (1963) (arguing neutrality principle fails to take into
account political realities of jurisprudence); Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A
Critique oflnterpretivism and Neutral Principles,96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 805-14 (1983) (arguing that
success of neutrality principle will come at cost of constitutional theory based on individualism).
35. As Professor Shapiro notes, Wechsler's support for neutral principles "was designed to
provide some basis for judicial activism in the face of a long-term, concerted effort by Judge [Learned]
Hand, Justice [Felix] Frankfurter, and their allies to limit severely or even eliminate the Supreme
Court's power to declare statutes unconstitutional." Shapiro, supra note 34, at 598.
36. See supra notes 19-26 and accompanying text for the Court's rationale in Shelley. For a fuller
discussion of this approach, see Mark D. Rosen, Was Shelley v. Kraemer Incorrectly Decided? Some
New Answers, 95 CAL. L. REV. 451, 470-83 (2007). Indeed, the Court used the Act to strike down
racially restrictive covenants in the District of Columbia. See Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 31 (1948)
(noting that District of Columbia is included in statutory language "every State and Territory").
37. One commentator has famously described Shelley as "constitutional law's Finnegan's Wake."
Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court, 1963 Term-Foreword: "Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to
the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government," 78 HARV. L. REV. 143, 148 (1964).
38. Louis Henkin lamented as early as the late 1960s that the Court "has not seized opportunities
to reconsider or clarify" Shelley, and that, doctrinally, "the case has become a citation for inadequacy
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when state courts directly confront the issue of state action involving private
agreements, they often precipitously and unpersuasively confine Shelley to its
facts. 39 However, state courts have been fickle in this regard, occasionally citing
the case for broader propositions of law. 40 Further, state judges regularly look to
federal state action cases for analytical guidance when resolving state action
questions posed by their own constitutions, often casually citing Shelley in the
process.4 1 Hence, while Shelley remains quiescent in state DOMA adjudication,
it nevertheless lies just beneath the surface of any future litigation regarding
same-sex private arrangements. 42 This is especially true in light of how
ambiguously some state DOMAs are drafted.

in the exercise of the judicial function in constitutional cases." Henkin, supra note 28, at 474 (citing
Wechsler, supra note 28, at 29).
39. See, e.g., MedValUSA Health Programs, Inc. v. MemberWorks, Inc., 872 A.2d 423, 434-35
(Conn. 2005) (concluding that judicial confirmation of private arbitration award of punitive damages is
not state action); People v. Brown, 660 N.E.2d 964, 970 (Ill. 1995) (finding no state action where
prosecution unknowingly uses perjured testimony in a criminal conviction). One justice of the
Washington Supreme Court even suggested that Shelley has been overruled sub silentio by subsequent
decisions. King v. King, 174 P.3d 659, 671 (Wash. 2007) (Sanders, J., concurring) (citing Lugar v.
Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 n.21 (1982)).
40. Compare In re Adoption of K.L.P., 763 N.E.2d 741, 750-51 (Il1. 2002) (stating in dicta that
"[tihere is ...some precedent for viewing the utilization of the judicial process by a private party to
affect the constitutional rights of another as 'state action.' . . . In the adoption context, the claim of
state action when the court system is utilized to terminate parental rights is, perhaps, even stronger
than in Shelley."); State v. Rideau, 943 So. 2d 559, 569-70 (La. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)) (reasoning that state court could not require convicted felon to pay costs
out of future movie or book rights, as this would be judicial abridgement of his right to free speech); In
re Crichfield Trust, 426 A.2d 88, 90 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1980) (stating that enforcement of
charitable trust by court is state action and citing Shelley in support); State v. Cardenas-Alvarez, 25
P.3d 225, 243 (N.M. 2001) (Baca, J., concurring) (stating that judicial admission of false evidence
obtained from federal agents is state action for purposes of state constitution); People v. Kern, 554
N.E.2d 1235, 1245-46 (N.Y. 1990) (citing Shelley in support of conclusion that judicial enforcement of
defense attorney's racially discriminatory peremptory challenges during jury selection can be
attributed to state); Nussenzweig v. diCorcia, 38 A.D.3d 339, 348 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (Tom, J.,
concurring) (observing that although "members of the community are not prohibited, by agreement,
from restricting their own freedom to dispose of their property, the courts are prohibited from lending
the state's power to enforce any such restriction to the extent that it infringes on the constitutional
rights of others"), with MedValUSA, 872 A.2d at 434-35 (declining to extend Shelley to judicial
confirmation of private arbitration award); Meisner v. Potlatch Corp., 954 P.2d 676, 680-81 (Idaho
1998) (finding Shelley inapplicable to judicial grant of summary judgment).
41. See, e.g., Cardenas-Alvarez, 25 P.3d at 243 (explaining that "'[s]tate action .. .refers to
exertions of state power in all forms' (quoting Shelley, 334 U.S. at 20)); Republican Party of Texas v.
Dietz, 940 S.W.2d 86, 88 n.2, 91 (Tex. 1997) (stating that federal decisions provide "a wealth of
guidance in our resolution of state action issues" for purposes of the Texas state constitution).
42. Popularly elected judges in a number of jurisdictions are under direct political pressure to
take positions on gay marriage and homosexuality in general. See, e.g., Nat Stern, The Looming
Collapse of Restrictions on Judicial Campaign Speech, 38 SETON HALL L. REv. 63, 99-100 (2008)
(discussing recent use of judicial campaign questionnaires to inquire about candidates' positions on
homosexuality and same-sex marriage). Shelley provides intellectual grist for opponents of private
ordering among homosexuals and jurisprudential grounds to hold agreements between same-sex
partners invalid.
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STATE DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE AMENDMENTS AND PRIVATE ORDERING

Without a right to marry or to obtain other state recognition for their
relationships, gay and lesbian couples have spent the last several decades
patching together sundry methods of private ordering to ensure that their wishes
are given some type of legitimacy. For example, gay couples have used powers of
attorney, domestic partnership agreements, cohabitation agreements, custody
and shared parenting agreements, insurance benefit designations, and other
forms of traditional contract to secure benefits for themselves and their loved
ones. 43 However, with passage of very broadly worded DOMA regulations, and
with the expansive interpretation of other DOMAs, the enforceability of these
contracts is now in doubt.44
In 2004, 2006, and 2008 various states placed DOMAs on the November
ballot through direct referenda or initiative processes. A number of these
proposed amendments were jarring in their scope. Virginia's DOMA, for
example, states:
This Commonwealth and its political subdivisions shall not create or
recognize a legal status for relationships of unmarried individuals that
intends to approximate the design, qualities, significance, or effects of
marriage. Nor shall this Commonwealth or its political subdivisions
create or recognize another union, partnership, or other legal status to
which is assigned the rights, benefits, obligations,qualities, or effects of
45
marriage.
Ohio's DOMA is similarly broad:
Only a union between one man and one woman may be a marriage
valid in or recognized by this state and its political subdivisions. This
state and its political subdivisions shall not create or recognize a legal
status for relationships of unmarried individuals that intends
to
46
approximate the design, qualities,significance or effect of marriage.
Other states employed alternative language, refusing to recognize
relationships that confer the "incidents" of marriage or unions that "replicat[e]
marriage. '47 Each of these states have laid textual snares to squelch a range of
43. For a survey of some of these methods, see Maureen B. Cohon, Where the Rainbow Ends:
Trying to Find a Pot of Gold for Same-Sex Couples in Pennsylvania, 41 DUQ.L. REV. 495, 497-98,

503-04, 509-10 (2003). For some empirical work on the topic, see Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Monica
Kirkpatrick Johnson, Legal Planning for Unmarried Committed Partners: Empirical Lessons for a
Preventive and Therapeutic Approach, 41 ARIz. L. REV. 417,435-56 (1999).

44. For a discussion of the difference in breadth of these amendments, and their effect on
unmarried heterosexual couples, see Mark Strasser, State Marriage Amendments and Overreaching:
On Plain Meaning, Good Public Policy, and Constitutional Limitations, 25 LAW & INEQ. 59, 77-81
(2007).
45. VA. CONST. art. I., § 15-A (emphasis added).
46. OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11 (emphasis added).
47. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 36.03(g) (invalidating any "union replicating marriage"); KAN.

CONST. art. 15, § 16(b) (declaring that state cannot recognize any "relationship" other than marriage
as entitling parties to "incidents" of marriage); KY. CONST., § 233A (prohibiting state from recognizing
"legal status identical or substantially similar to that of marriage"); LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15

(forbidding state law from requiring "marriage or the legal incidents thereof' to be conferred on any
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same-sex legal relationships. Nevertheless, voters approved these amendments
48
by substantial margins.
According to DOMA activists, this broad language was designed to prevent
the state from creating or recognizing same-sex marriages, state civil unions, or
domestic partnership registries, whether by legislative, executive, administrative,
or judicial action. DOMA supporters particularly chafed at civil unions and
other forms of same-sex domestic relationships, which they disparagingly termed
49
"fake" or "counterfeit" marriages.
State DOMA activists publicly disclaimed an intent to invalidate purely
private contractual relationships between same-sex partners. During the 2006
campaigns, these DOMA activists dismissed as alarmist opponents' claims that
DOMA threatened private agreements. 50 But the breadth of some DOMA
language itself, as well as the positions of some DOMA advocates, belies those
assurances. A recent decision from the Michigan Supreme Court may be a
bellwether.

"union other than the union of one man and one woman"); OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 35 (forbidding any
provision of law to "require that marital status or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon
unmarried couples or groups"). A recent addition is the Florida constitution, which now forbids unions
that are the "substantial equivalent" of marriage. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 27. The amendment passed by a
62% to 38% margin. Emanuella Grinberg, Mixed Results on Measures Banning Same-Sex Marriage,
CNN.cOM, Nov. 5, 2008, http://edition.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/11/04/state.laws/index.html.
48. According to Christian Life Resources, DOMA amendments had the following passage
percentages: Kentucky (75%), Georgia (77%), Ohio (62%), Arkansas (75%), Oklahoma (76%),
Mississippi (86%), Montana (66%), North Dakota (73%), Utah (66%). Christian Life Resources,
Homosexuality and Same-Sex Marriage Timeline, http://www.christianliferesources.com/?library/
view.php&articleid=915 (last visited May 29, 2009). For additional results, see CNN.com, Election
2004 - Ballot Measures, http://www.cnn.com/ELECrION/2004/pages/results/ballot.measures (last
visited June 30, 2009).
49. Jerry Cox, of the Arkansas Marriage Amendment Committee, voiced the sentiments of many
of his fellows: "It's a counterfeit marriage. A civil union undermines the value of a real marriage the
same way counterfeit money would undermine the value of real money." Laura Kellams, Fair Play,
Family Fuse Amendment Altercation, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Sept. 5, 2004, at Al. Randy
Thomasson, executive director of Campaign for California Families, called civil unions "homosexual
marriage by another name" and urged President Bush to "resist counterfeit marriages with all his
might." Election 2004: Campaign Watch, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Oct. 27, 2004, at 8A. For a general
criticism of the constitutionalization of marriage, see J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Gay Rights and
American Constitutionalism: What's a Constitution For?, 56 DUKE L.J. 545, 550-53 (2006). For a
discussion of the rhetoric of "counterfeiting" in the marriage debates, see generally Courtney Megan
Cahill, The Genuine Article: A Subversive Economic Perspective on the Law's ProcreationistVision of
Marriage,64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 393 (2007).
50. See, e.g., Rebecca Mowbray, La. Voting on Gay Marriage Ban, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 18,
2004, at A3 (quoting one Louisiana legislator as saying Louisiana's DOMA would not "affect private
relationships between individuals or businesses. It doesn't affect private contracts at all."); William C.
Duncan,
Friends
with
Benefits?,
NAT'L
REv.
ONLINE,
Oct.
17,
2006,
http://article.nationalreview.coml?q=YWU5NmQxMDc2NGZiNTMOYTcONmZjZTBmMmUwNDYz
Njc= (denying that marriage amendments, in practice, would eliminate existing rights of unmarried
couples). But see Mowbray, supra (quoting study by Public Affairs Research Council of Louisiana
which noted "legal analysts are split on the potential impact of the amendment on private contracts").
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National Pride at Work, Inc. v. Governor of Michigan5' concerned whether
Michigan, through its municipalities and public universities, could offer benefits
to its employees' same-sex partners. National Pride at Work, Inc. (a nonprofit
affiliate of the AFL-CIO) as well as employees of the city of Kalamazoo,
Michigan, the University of Michigan, Wayne State University, and other state
subdivisions and entities, asked the state court to declare that the college and
municipal benefit plans did not violate Michigan's DOMA.52 The benefit plans
varied in some particulars, but each allowed employees to cover their domestic
partners so long as the partner was at least eighteen years old, not a blood
relative, of the same sex as the employee, and the employee's exclusive domestic
partner for at least six months prior to enrollment. 53 After winning at the trial
level, the plaintiffs lost their suit in the Michigan Court of Appeals. 54 The
Michigan Supreme Court granted leave to appeal and affirmed the intermediate
55
court in a five to two decision.
The court's opinion followed a close textual exegesis of Michigan's DOMA
amendment. 56 Michigan's DOMA states: "To secure and preserve the benefits of
marriage for our society and for future generations of children, the union of one
man and one woman in marriage shall be the only agreement recognized as a
57
marriage or similar union for any purpose."
The court first outlined its constitutional methodology. According to the
majority, the court's obligation is to "determine the original meaning of the
provision to the ratifiers."5 8 The original meaning is "'the sense most obvious to
the common understanding'; 59 in other words, the "plain meaning at the time of
ratification. "'60
The court then delved into two key words from the amendment, "similar"
and "union." Plaintiffs argued that the city and universities' benefit plans did not
recognize a "same-sex" partner as a married spouse, because none of the benefit
plans characterized these relationships as marriage. 61 The majority quickly
dismissed this argument. The constitutional language forbade state recognition
51. 748 N.W.2d 524 (Mich. 2008).

52. Nat'l Pride at Work, 748 N.W.2d at 529-30. The plaintiffs' resort to litigation was forced by
the fact that the local United Auto Workers and state labor officials had reached a tentative
agreement to include same-sex domestic partner benefits in its contract. Id. at 529.
53. Id. at 531-32.
54. Id. at 530.
55. Id. at 531, 543.
56. Textualism is commonly used by state courts as a sort of default methodology. G. ALAN
TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 195 (1998) (citing William F. Swindler, State
Constitutionsfor the 20th Century, 50 NEB. L. REV. 577, 593 (1971)).
57. MICH. CONST. art. I, § 25.
58. Nat'l Prideat Work, 748 N.W.2d at 533.

59. Id. (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 66 (1868)).
60. Id. Compare this to the methodology used by lower Ohio courts as discussed in Strasser,
supra note 44, at 93-95.
61. Nat'l Pride at Work, 748 N.W.2d at 533. In fact, one of the plans acknowledged that Michigan
law prohibited marriage between same-sex couples. ld. at 532.
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of nonmarital relationships "'as a marriage or similar union.' ' 62 Referring to
Webster's Dictionary, the court stated that "union" meant a "'combination...
joined or associated together for some common purpose.' ' 63 "Similar" meant
"'having a likeness or resemblance . . . having qualities in common."' 64 Simply
because the entire panoply of legal rights did not flow from a domestic
partnership as from marriage did not mean that the domestic partnership was
65
not a union "similar" to marriage.
"Recognize," according to the court, meant "'to perceive or acknowledge as
existing, true, or valid.' 66 The court reasoned that "[w]hen a public employer
attaches legal consequence to a relationship, that employer is clearly
'recognizing' that relationship." 67 Similarly, the court concluded that the "only
agreement" language in the amendment meant that marriage, as defined as a
union between a man and a woman, was the sole domestic arrangement between
two persons that could be recognized "for any purpose"-explicitly excluding
domestic partnerships from recognition, even if the partnership was entered into
not to simulate "marriage" but solely for purposes of obtaining benefits from an
employer. 68 The court continued to stick close to the text, dismissing the
plaintiffs' argument that public provision of health-care benefits to same-sex
couples was not a "benefit of marriage." 69 The court concluded that the voters of
Michigan had decided to achieve the objective of "secur[ing] and preserv[ing]
the benefits of marriage" by forbidding public recognition of any domestic unit
that was not a heterosexual marriage. 70 Whether the people of Michigan had
voted for a wise or effective way to regulate marriage was not for the justices to
71
decide.
Although DOMA advocates had assured voters in the press and in a public
hearing that Michigan's DOMA would not affect the health-insurance benefits
of domestic partners, 72 the court regarded these extrinsic statements as

62. Id. at 533 (quoting MICH. CONST. art. I, § 25).
63. Id. (quoting RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY (1991)).
64. Id. at 534 (quoting RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY).
65. Nat'l Pride at Work, 748 N.W.2d at 534.
66. Id. at 537 (quoting RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY).

67. Id.
68. Id. at 538-39.
69. Id.
70. Nat'l Pride at Work, 748 N.W.2d at 539 (quoting MICH. CONST. art. I, § 25).

71. Id.
72. Marlene Elwell, the campaign director for Citizens for the Protection of Marriage ("CPM"),
told USA Today that "[tlhis [amendment] has nothing to do with taking benefits away. This is about
marriage between a man and a woman." Id. at 547 (Kelly, J., dissenting) (citing Charisese Jones, Gay
Marriage on Ballot in 11 States, USA TODAY, Oct. 15, 2004, at A3) (first alteration in original). Two
weeks later, Kristina Hemphill, CPM's communications director, told the Holland [Michigan] Sentinel
that the gay couples' benefits would not be affected and that "[t]his Amendment has nothing to do
with benefits." Id. (citing John Burdick, MarriageIssue Splits Voters, HOLLAND SENTINEL, Oct. 30,
2004). Finally, counsel for CPM told the Michigan State Board of Canvassers during a hearing that
there would be "nothing to preclude [a] public employer from extending [health-care] benefits ... as a
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immaterial. First, the majority noted that advocates both for and against the
amendment had argued that Michigan's DOMA would in fact prohibit
partnership benefits.7 3 Second, the extrinsic evidence merely reinforced the
majority's textual approach: "[b]ecause we cannot read voters' minds to
determine whose views they relied on and whose they ignored.., we must look
to the actual language of the amendment." 74 The plain text of Michigan's
DOMA unambiguously "prohibits public employers from providing health75
insurance benefits to their employees' qualified same-sex domestic partners."
The Michigan Supreme Court refused to speculate whether its ruling would
affect private employers and private agreements, stating tersely: "[T]his opinion
does not address whether private employers can provide health-insurance
benefits to their employees' same-sex domestic partners." 76 However, that thin
clause will not long secure private agreements from the weight of the court's
textualist reasoning. The very arguments that the court accepted to strike down
public provision of benefits for same-sex partners are easily used to challenge
public enforcement of benefits for same-sex partners provided in the private
sector. That is particularly true if the Michigan Supreme Court accepts a Shelleytype analysis of its own role in adjudicating private same-sex agreements.
As Shelley's commentators have recognized, all private agreements operate
against a backdrop of government enforcement. Indeed, scholars of the first
generation of legal realists characterized private ordering as nothing more than
an ex ante capacity to enlist the government to come to your aid. 77 Given this
reality, the textualist reasoning of National Pride at Work-coupled with
Shelley's insight that a court can be a state actor when it enforces private
agreements-implicates
enforcement
of private
domestic partnership
arrangements.
The linchpin of National Pride at Work is the court's definition of
"recognize." The court said that Michigan recognizes a domestic partnership
anytime it "'perceive[s]"' or .'acknowledge[s]"' that partnership as "'existing,
true, or valid.' 78 Assuming that gay and lesbian couples form contracts to confer

matter of contract between employer and employee." Id. at 546 (first and second alterations in
original).
73. Nat'l Pride at Work, 748 N.W.2d at 540-42 & n.22. A look at the actual language cited by the
majority is not so clear cut. The position of Gary Glenn, President of the American Family
Association of Michigan, stated simply that same-sex partnerships could not be granted special legal
treatment akin to that of marriage, as contrasted with an open policy that allowed employees to
designate whomever they wished as beneficiaries. Brief of Amicus Curiae American Family
Association of Michigan at 6-8, Nat'l Prideat Work, 748 N.W.2d 524 (No. 133554).
74. Nat'l Pride at Work, 748 N.W.2d at 541 n.23.
75. Id. at 543.
76. Id. at 529-30 n.1.

77. See, e.g., Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38
POL. Sd. Q. 470, 471-72 (1923) (discussing government enforcement of property rights); Louis L.
Jaffee, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HARv. L. REv. 201,217-18 (1937) (discussing enforcement
of contracts by state in context of property).
78. Nat'l Pride at Work, 748 N.W.2d at 537 (quoting RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE
DICTIONARY (1991)).
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benefits to their partners, benefits that they would enjoy but for the fact that
they cannot marry, then the entire edifice of their private ordering assumes a
state court may "recognize" those legal relationships. However, lashed to the
Michigan Supreme Court's text-bound reasoning, if "recognize" includes any
government perception or acknowledgment of the legal relationship as "existing,
true, or valid" then how may a court enforce such agreements without
"recognizing" the union behind them? If, as the court states, public employers
"recognize" a same-sex relationship by "attach[ing] legal consequence to a
relationship," then why isn't any state judicial enforcement of same-sex
partnership arrangements a species of impermissible "recognition"? And if that
is the case, then the test for the enforceability of agreements between same-sex
couples in Michigan is not whether the agreement is "public" or "private," but
simply whether the agreement confers benefits that simulate a marriage or
"similar union." 79 For example, if the Episcopal Diocese of Michigan were to
offer benefits to the same-sex partners of its employees upon the same terms as
those that were offered by the University of Michigan, National Pride at Work
suggests that a state court could not adjudicate any dispute over that beneficiary
agreement, because to do so would "recognize" the domestic partnership of the
80
couple-a "union" "similar" to marriage.
Further, a state court could only conclude that its enforcement of a private
agreement is a "recognition" of such a union if it adopts-explicitly or
implicitly-Shelley's proposition that state judicial enforcement of a private
agreement can be state action. This is because, prior to Shelley, state judges had
no framework in which to understand their enforcement of private agreements
as implicating the state at all.81 Only after Shelley did the state judge's very
choice whether to enforce a private agreement acquire constitutional
significance.
Although National Pride at Work is the most recent and fully developed
opinion on DOMA and domestic partnership arrangements, it is not alone.
79. In this sense, even the question of intent becomes irrelevant. The touchstone is not whether
the relationship was formed expressly to mirror marriage; the touchstone is whether the legal
relationship in some sense "looks like" an aspect of marriage.
80. I have chosen the Episcopal Diocese because church organization benefit plans are exempt
from the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), Pub. L. No. 93-406,
88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.). ERISA would
presumably preempt any contrary state law, including the state constitution. See Wood v. Prudential
Ins. Co. of Am., 207 F.3d 674, 676 n.4 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting lower court's conclusion that ERISA
preempted action under state constitution). A more detailed discussion of which disputes over private
benefit plans would be governed by state law and which would be governed by ERISA is beyond the
scope of this Essay.
81. See, e.g., Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 330 (1926) (stating that enforcement of private
racially restrictive covenants does not raise any constitutional issues); Duncan Kennedy, From the Will
Theory to the Principle of Private Autonomy: Lon Fuller's "Consideration and Form," 100 COLUM. L.

REv. 94, 124 n.98 (2000) (noting that Shelley captured a political awareness that "the state was
responsible for the effects brought about by private law mechanisms"); Shelley Ross Saxer, Shelley v.
Kraemer's Fiftieth Anniversary: "A Time for Keeping; A Time for Throwing Away"?, 47 U. KAN. L.
REv. 61, 80 (1998) (noting that racially restrictive covenants were generally upheld in years prior to
Shelley v. Kraemer).
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Other cases that address the effect of DOMA on private ordering between samesex couples continue to percolate through the state courts. In Ohio, for instance,
a state legislator sued Miami University in Oxford, Ohio, a state institution, on
the ground that the university's extension of benefits to same-sex partners
violated Ohio's DOMA. 2 Miami University's benefit plan mirrored those struck
down in NationalPride at Work. Miami University required domestic partners to
file a sworn affidavit regarding their cohabitation arrangements, purposes,
duration, and consanguinity. 83 The plaintiff claimed that through Miami
University's policy, Ohio had "use[d] . . .its singular position and powers to
publicly affirm, validate and support a nonmarital, marriage-mimicking
relationship that has been historically suspect and impugned." 84 This affirmation
"inescapably carries with it an implicit negative commentary on [marriage] and
diminishes the legally unique status accorded the socially fundamental institution
85
of marriage."
The Court of Common Pleas found the plaintiff had no standing and
granted summary judgment to the university, but not without opining in dicta:
Arguably, the state of Ohio, through its instrumentality or arm,
Miami University, has done that which is constitutionally proscribed. It
has seemingly created a category of persons, same-sex domestic
partners of its employees, to whom the state extends the same kind of
medical-insurance benefits, and perhaps other benefits, that the state
has traditionally reserved for spouses of employees. It is obvious that
.. . to qualify for benefits, the relationship between
the cohabiting
86
persons must be virtually the same as that of spouses.
In the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska, the court
held that Nebraska's DOMA violated the federal constitution. 87 Nebraska's
DOMA stated: "Only marriage between. a man and a woman shall be valid or
recognized in Nebraska. The uniting of two persons of the same sex in a civil
union, domestic partnership, or other similar same-sex relationship shall not be
88
valid or recognized in Nebraska."
The district court ruled the amendment unconstitutional in part because a
strict textualist definition of "civil union" and "domestic partnership" could
sweep in "real estate transactions, prenuptial agreements and business
agreements in Nebraska." 89 Even ordinary cohabitation agreements between
roommates of the same sex could be invalid, depending on whether the state was

82. Brinkman v. Miami Univ., 861 N.E.2d 925, 926, 930 (Ohio Ct. Com. PI. 2005) (granting
summary judgment to defendant due to lack of plaintiff standing), affd, No. CA2006-12-313, 2007 WL
2410390, at *14 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 27,2007).
83. Id. at 928.
84. Complaint at 14, Brinkman, 861 N.E.2d 925 (No. CV 2005-11-3736).
85. Id.
86. Brinkman, 861 N.E.2d at 933.
87. Citizens for Equal Protection, Inc. v. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d 980, 995, 1005, 1008 (D. Neb.
2005), rev'd, 455 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2006).
88. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29.
89. Citizens for Equal Protection, 368 F. Supp. 2d at 1005.
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willing to conduct a demeaning investigation into the "intimate sexual practices
of its citizens." 90 The Eighth Circuit reversed, finding Nebraska's DOMA
survived rational basis review. 91 These cases are but a sample of litigation that
opponents of same-sex marriage have either commenced or participated in as
92
interveners or amici in various states.
Private ordering between same-sex couples is threatened because the very
breadth of some state DOMAs supports a blanket prohibition of private
agreements between or benefiting homosexual partners. First, most DOMAs
contain few textual guidelines as to what types of agreements, beyond marriage,
are prohibited. 93 The broader DOMAs lapse into loose language that sweep in
agreements that are "similar" to or "approximate" marriage, or that confer the
"incidents" or "qualities" of marriage. 94 This laxity compels a judge to
determine, quality by quality, incident by incident, what actually constitutes a
marriage. 95 Only then may the judge determine whether a nonmarital agreement
is intended to or does confer that quality. 96 Second, the pre- and postenactment
activity of state DOMA proponents betrays a marked hostility to any recognition
of same-sex relationships, public or private. State DOMA supporters have
sponsored numerous economic campaigns against private entities that offer

90. Id.
91. Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859, 871 (8th Cir. 2006).
92. An ironic twist in DOMA litigation are the cases in which an individual attempts to use a
state DOMA to invalidate an agreement with an estranged same-sex partner. For example, in Hobbs
v. Van Stavern, Julie Hobbs, the biological parent of a child identified as "T.L.H.," conducted a nineyear relationship with Janet Kathleen Van Stavern. 249 S.W.3d 1, 2-3 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006). Van
Stavern subsequently adopted T.L.H. Id. at 3. After dissolution of their relationship, Van Stavern
asked the court to declare that she and Hobbs were joint conservators of T.L.H. Id. Hobbs argued in
response that Van Stavern's adoption was void on grounds of public policy and for the legal reason
that her adoption was void ab initio because "the trial court's '[elntertainment and resolution' of
Kathleen's [lawsuit] was . . . 'tantamount' to a 'proclamation' validating same-sex relationships." Id. at
5 (quoting brief of appellant Hobbs); see also Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 661 S.E.2d 822, 824-25
(Va. 2008) (referring to lesbian mother's argument that Virginia's DOMA invalidated her former
partner's visitation rights for their child).
93. One of the few states that has clarified the effect of its DOMA on private contract is South
Carolina, which expressly protected private agreements in its DOMA. See S.C. CONST. art. XVII, § 15
("This section shall not prohibit or limit parties, other than the State or its political subdivisions, from
entering into contracts or other legal instruments."). Although some states, like Ohio, have passed
legislation aimed at preserving private contracts, the text of these statutes cannot be squared easily
with the breadth of the Ohio constitutional amendment. Compare OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11
(prohibiting recognition of any legal status of unmarried individuals approximating marriage), with
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3101.01(C)(3)(b) (2003) (specifically excepting "private agreements that are
otherwise valid under the laws of this state").
94. See supra note 6 for the text of several such state constitutions.
95. For example, is cohabitation a "quality" of marriage? What about cohabitation for a specific
duration? Cohabitation with sexual relations? Cohabitation with sexual relations and adoption?
96. Judge Harvie Wilkinson notes the irony in this situation. Wilkinson, supra note 49, at 549-50.
Advocates pushed these amendments by lashing out at "judicial tyrants," and judges "redefining
marriage" by "legislating from the bench." But, by their ambiguous wording, these same advocates
have handed back to the courts the ability to atomize marriage by stripping it to its legal essentials. Id.
at 577-80.
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97
same-sex benefits or advertise in predominantly gay and lesbian publications. 98
They have declared same-sex domestic partnership registries unconstitutional.
Recently, an Ohio-based group filed an amicus brief arguing that an Ohio law
criminalizing domestic violence between unmarried couples was unconstitutional
under Ohio's DOMA. 99 Legislatively, Virginia passed the Affirmation of
Marriage Act, which prohibits "[a] civil union, partnership contract or other
arrangement between persons of the same sex purporting to bestow the
privileges or obligations of marriage."' ° The Act further states that "[a]ny such
civil union, partnership contract or other arrangement entered into by persons of
the same sex in another state or jurisdiction shall be void in all respects in
Virginia and any contractual rights created thereby shall be void and
0
unenforceable."1 1
These efforts suggest that at least some anti-gay marriage groups may
follow a strategy of "incrementalism" designed to eventually deny homosexuals
protections or benefits under either public or private auspices. 10 2 But even if the
assurances of DOMAs' proponents can be taken at face value, the
constitutionalization of broad and untethered language effectively takes the issue
out of their hands. 10 3 It has become a matter for the courts. Ohio, for example,
has sent signals that it will construe its broadly worded DOMA narrowly, while
Michigan has signaled that it will construe its relatively narrowly drawn

97. For example, the American Family Association, which claims to have over 700,000 members,
conducted a three-year boycott against Ford for, among other things, "mak[ing] corporate donations
to homosexual organizations that . . . promote civil unions or same-sex marriage," supporting gay
pride parades, and "advertising on homosexual Web sites and through homosexual media outlets."
Suspends Boycott,
Meets Conditions; AFA
Family Association, Ford
American
http://www.afa.net/emails/transform.asp?x=ford_031008&s=browser&y=2008&m=03 (last visited June
30, 2009). The group also conducted an unsuccessful nine-year boycott of Disney for extending
benefits to same sex-partners. Christian Conservatives Push U.S. Companies on Gay Rights,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 6, 2005, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/banking/
005-12-06-christian-conservativesx.htm.
98. See, e.g., Robert Vitale, City Slow to Add Registry for Gay Couples, COLUMBUS DISPATCH,
June 29, 2008, at 1B (noting that a prominent DOMA advocate believes domestic registries are
unconstitutional).
99. Brief Amicus Curiae of Citizens for Community Values Urging Reversal at 1-2, State v.
Carswell, 871 N.E.2d 547 (Ohio 2007) (No. 06-151). Professor Marc Spindelman notes that Citizens for
Community Values submitted this brief even though its key spokesperson had publicly derided the
notion that Ohio's DOMA would invalidate the domestic battery laws. Marc Spindelman, State v.
CarswelL" The Whipsaws of Backlash, 24 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 165,174 (2007).
100. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.3 (2008).
101. Id. When asked whether the Act would prohibit a contract that conferred some, but not all,
of the rights associated with marriage, one of its sponsors demurred: "I guess we don't know that yet
....That's what the courts are for; they'll figure that out." Julian Sanchez, Not for Lovers: Banning
Same-Sex Contracts,REASON, Aug. 1, 2004, at 12.
102. Cf.Janet Hook, Conservative Social Agenda a GOP Challenge, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 19,2003, at
21 (noting antiabortion activists have adopted "mostly incremental measures that do not strike directly
at abortion rights").
103. See Wilkinson, supra note 49, at 576-77 (discussing irony of giving "ultimate interpretive
authority" of DOMAs to judges).

HeinOnline -- 81 Temp. L. Rev. 983 2008

TEMPLE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

amendment broadly. 1° 4 Other state courts have yet to decide how to apply
DOMAs to the public and private contractual sphere. 10 5 The uncertainty alone
has left same-sex couples in doubt about the validity of their legal instruments. 106
IV.

FEDERAL STATE ACrION CHALLENGES TO

DOMAs

The breadth of these state DOMAs leads to the flip side of our Mobius
strip. Shelley v. Kraemer'017 concluded that state judges cannot enforce racially
discriminatory private covenants because the very act of enforcement by the
state judge violates the Equal Protection Clause. 10 8 National Pride at Work, Inc.
v. Governor of Michigan'0 9 supports the proposition that Michigan's DOMA
forbids state judges from enforcing private agreements between same-sex
couples when those agreements require "recognition" of "marriage-like"
relationships. 10° Ironically, however, to the extent that a DOMA purports to
leave homosexual couples bereft of the benefits of generally applicable state
contract law, that construction of DOMA may itself be a species of "state
action" forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Specifically, if a DOMA is read to render certain private
agreements between homosexuals unenforceable, and those agreements would
be enforceable for any other group of persons, such construction would almost
111
certainly violate the equal protection holding of Romer v. Evans.
In Romer, Colorado voters approved a statewide referendum, Amendment
2, that forbade state or municipal protection for homosexuals in any public or
private arena. 112 Amendment 2 supporters designed this amendment to repeal
several Colorado municipal and administrative regulations that prohibited

104. See Carswell, 871 N.E.2d at 554 (holding that Ohio's DOMA does not abrogate state
domestic violence statute). But see Nat'l Pride at Work v. Gov. of Mich., 748 N.W.2d 524, 542-43
(Mich. 2008) (calling Carswell unpersuasive authority).
105. E.g., Nat'l Pride at Work, 748 N.W.2d at 529 n.1 (noting that opinion does not address ability
of private employers to provide benefits to same-sex partners).
106. See Mowbray, supra note 50 (noting concern of same-sex couples in Louisiana that DOMA
could invalidate private contracts related to property and medical decisions).
107. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
108. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 20.
109. 748 N.W.2d 524 (Mich. 2008).
110. Nat'l Pride at Work, 748 N.W.2d at 543.
111. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). I will leave aside the thornier issue of whether DOMAs construed to
preclude
any private
domestic
agreement-homosexual
or heterosexual-are
similarly
unconstitutional.
112. The precise language of the amendment was as follows:
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any of its
agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or
enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual
orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or
entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota preferences,
protected status or claim of discrimination. This Section of the Constitution shall be in all
respects self-executing.
COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b, invalidatedby Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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discrimination based on sexual orientation.11 3 To Amendment 2 supporters,
these antidiscrimination regulations were an affront to their rights of association
and religious and familial liberty, and their sense of good public policy.
The Colorado Supreme Court first interpreted the terms of Amendment 2.
Although it demurred on the precise scope of the amendment, the court held
that Amendment 2's stated aim, prohibiting homosexuals "from obtaining
legislative, executive, and judicial protection or redress from discrimination
absent.., adoption of a constitutional amendment," was broad enough to trigger
constitutional review and to warrant a preliminary injunction barring its
enforcement. 114 After trial and a subsequent appeal, the court switched its
analysis from the scope of the amendment under the state constitution to its
constitutionality under the United States Constitution. The state court concluded
that Amendment 2 violated the federal guarantee of equal protection. 115 The
Colorado court reviewed the amendment under a strict scrutiny standard, finding
that Amendment 2 burdened homosexuals' fundamental right to participate in
the electoral process.11 6 Under this standard, Amendment 2 was unconstitutional
because it did not further any compelling interest, nor was it narrowly tailored to
117
advance those interests, even if they were compelling.
The United States Supreme Court affirmed, albeit suggesting a different
level of constitutional scrutiny.11 8 Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority,
acknowledged that Amendment 2 targeted municipal and administrative
protections for homosexuals.11 9 However, as the Court noted, "Amendment 2, in
explicit terms, does more than repeal or rescind these provisions. It prohibits all
legislative, executive or judicial action at any level of state or local government
designed to protect [homosexuals]. 1 20 The amendment was so broadly written
that it effectively "nullif[ied]" regulations designed to protect this "class in all
transactions in housing, sale of real estate, insurance, health and welfare services,
private education, and employment," 12 1 and barred homosexuals from securing
any protection from discrimination except through the extraordinary effort of
"enlisting the citizenry of Colorado to amend the State Constitution or perhaps
1 22
...by trying to pass helpful laws of general applicability."

113. Romer, 517 U.S. at 623-24.
114. Evans v. Romer (Evans 1), 854 P.2d 1270, 1285-86 (Colo. 1993).
115. See Evans v. Romer (Evans I1), 882 P.2d 1335, 1341, 1350 (Colo. 1994) (finding that
Amendment 2 was not narrowly tailored to serve compelling governmental interest).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1342-48. Among the "compelling state" interests that Amendment 2 supporters
offered were "(1) deterring factionalism; (2) preserving the integrity of the state's political functions;
(3) preserving the ability of the state to remedy discrimination against suspect classes; (4) preventing
the government from interfering with personal, familial, and religious privacy; [and] (5) preventing
[the] government from subsidizing the political objectives of a special interest group." Id. at 1339.
118. Romer, 517 U.S. at 631-32.
119. Id. at 623-24.
120. Id. at 624.
121. Id. at 629.
122. Id. at 631.
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The result was that
[h]omosexuals, by state decree, [were] put in a solitary class with
respect to transactions and relations in both the private and
governmental spheres. The amendment withdr[ew] from homosexuals,
but no others, specific legal protection from the injuries caused by
discrimination,
and
it [forbade]
reinstatement
of these
123
[antidiscrimination] laws and policies.
In essence, Amendment 2 made homosexuals in Colorado "stranger[s] to its
124
laws."
Even assuming Amendment 2 enjoyed rational basis review, the lowest
level of judicial scrutiny for equal protection, 125 it still foundered. "First," Justice
Kennedy began, "the amendment has the peculiar property of imposing a broad
and undifferentiated disability on a single named group, an exceptional and...
invalid form of legislation. Second,' 26 the Justice continued, Amendment 2's
"sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the
amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it
affects." 127 Consequently, "it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state
128
interests."
Romer implies that a constitution construed to prohibit enforcement of
private agreements between homosexuals would, in and of itself, violate equal
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Following the winding path of
state action, we begin with Shelley, which held that the Fourteenth Amendment
forbids state court enforcement of certain private agreements. Then we arrive at
the twist of state DOMAs, which hold that state courts cannot enforce certain
private agreements. With Romer we end up at the same point on the flip side of
the Mrbius strip. After Romer, the Fourteenth Amendment requires that certain
private agreements between same-sex couples be enforced because a state
court's decision to refuse to enforce these contracts under state DOMA is itself a
violation of federal equal protection. As with Shelley, Romer suggests that states
cannot configure their constitution to place private agreements involving samesex partners on the unenforceable side, and all other private agreements on the
enforceable side. 129 Such a state rule is incongruent with the Fourteenth
Amendment.

123. Romer, 517 U.S. at 627.
124. Id. at 635.
125. Laws that neither burden fundamental rights (such as the right to parent children) nor
discriminate based on a narrow list of suspect classes (such as race) are generally constitutional so long
as the "legislative classification ... bears a rational relation to some legitimate end." Id. at 631 (citing
Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-20 (1993)).
126. Id. at 632.
127. Id.
128. Romer, 517 U.S. at 632.
129. Professor Spindelman would go further and maintain that a state may not distinguish
between married and unmarried couples when the only basis for doing so is traditional morality.
Spindelman, supra note 99, at 179-80. While I do not necessarily agree with him on this specific point,
I am thankful for his insight as to the division between the constitutional and the unconstitutional.
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V.

THREE LESSONS

So what does this flight into topology have to say about the law in general
or constitutional interpretation in particular? At the most general, this M6bius
strip conceit helps us recognize that even measured constitutional interpretive
efforts can become contorted. In angling for a neutral principle in Shelley v.
Kraemer,1 30 the Supreme Court has unwittingly given state judges a
jurisprudential hook to hold private agreements unenforceable under their state
constitutions, a construction that itself may run afoul of federal equal protection.
The complexity of this doctrinal twist is good for legal academics, but generally
bad for the law itself. At best it makes constitutional adjudication seem
unnecessarily baroque; at worst it makes it seem like an elaborate parlor trick.
This is not to say that the goal of neutral principles of adjudication should
be discarded. Far from it. Even if neutral principles are not in some platonic
sense possible, 31 the aspiration to and appearance of neutral legal rules acts as a
professional and psychological check on judges and helps ensure confidence in
the judicial system. 132 Instead, there are at least three lessons to be derived from
this exercise. All three lessons aim to reduce the risk of unanticipated and
unconstitutional state bending of federal Supreme Court doctrine, while still
regarding the quest for neutral principles as an admirable enterprise, if an
occasionally quixotic one.
First, the Supreme Court of the United States should be cautious when it
articulates neutral principles, because the states are watching. Second, the
Supreme Court should avoid constitutional questions that require neutral
principles when legislative rules provide grounds for decision. Third, state courts,
legislators, administrators, and activists must inform themselves of and anticipate
their highest court's interpretive methodology, especially with respect to direct
democracy, which too often produces ill-considered and poorly worded
constitutional innovations.
A.

Neutral Principlesand State Constitutionalism

The United States Supreme Court must be mindful, not only of how
subordinate federal courts will construe its decisions, but of how the wildcard of
state judiciaries will implement its decisions. It is well documented that state
supreme courts often take cues from the United States Supreme Court. 133 This
"lockstep" approach applies not only to state court interpretation of state
analogues to the federal constitution, but also to the very interpretive
130. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).

131. Because, after all, justice is administered by human beings, not biblical sages or computers.
132. See Shapiro,supra note 34, at 600 (arguing that political realities of judicial review demand
"the traditional myth of the impersonal, non-political, law-finding judge whose decisions are the result
of the inexorable logic of the law and not his own preferences and discretion").
133. See TARR, supra note 56, at 200 (noting that "state judges regularly inquire into how sister
courts, both state and federal, have interpreted similar [constitutional] provisions"); James A.
Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REv. 761, 788 (1992) (noting
state constitutional decisions incorporate federal interpretations of key principles).
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methodology that state courts use to examine their respective foundational
documents. 134 This is not to say that state supreme courts should ignore
compelling Supreme Court precedent when it is applicable and analytically
useful. Nor does it suggest that the United States Supreme Court should or even
could predetermine how fifty state courts, with their own agendas and
constitutional imperatives, will apply a Supreme Court interpretive principle to
their own constitutions. But it does counsel a greater degree of circumspection
when the Supreme Court decides to cast new tools of constitutional
jurisprudence.
As we have seen, Shelley's state action doctrine, when applied to state
judicial acts under state DOMAs, has the potential to render even private
agreements between same-sex couples unenforceable. But the torque state
judiciaries can exert on federal constitutional principles is not limited to equal
protection or state action. For example, the Thirteenth Amendment applies not
only to slavery itself, but, in some interpretations, to forbid the "incidents" of
slavery as well. 135 Kansas, Louisiana, and Oklahoma all have DOMAs that
forbid state recognition of agreements that confer the "incidents" of marriage.
To the extent the Supreme Court crafts a methodology to define "incidents," it
can have an effect on the methodology states use to define "incidents" in these
136
constitutions.
Elsewhere in the constitution, the Supreme Court recently held that
restrictions -on handguns in the District of Columbia violated a Second
Amendment right to self-defense. 137 Key to that decision was the Court's belief
that the Second Amendment's framers contemplated a cadre of armed yeoman
who could be called to defend against invasion or suppress armed rebellion at a
moment's notice. t38 The Idaho Constitution provides that all able-bodied men
between eighteen and forty-five must be enrolled in the militia. 139 Idaho could
conceivably pass a law making it a criminal offense for any adult not to own a
14 0

gun.

134. Gardner, supra note 133, at 791 (noting that state judges use federal decisions as "a
generous source of off-the-shelf standards and analyses for application to state constitutional
problems").
135. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968) (noting Court's agreement that
Thirteenth Amendment forbids "incidents of slavery," as well as slavery itself).
136. See Strasser, supra note 44, at 69-73 (discussing various interpretations of "incidents of
marriage").
137. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2801 (2008). For a full treatment of this case,
see generally Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns as Smut: Defending the Home-Bound Second Amendment, 109
COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009).
138. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2799-2803.
139. IDAHO CONST. art. XIV, § 1. This provision is subject to some exceptions for those with
religious objections to bearing weapons.
140. Lest one think this is a straw man, both Greenleaf, Idaho and Kennesaw, Georgia have
passed municipal ordinances requiring each "head of household" in their respective communities to
own a firearm and ammunition. KENNESAW, GA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 34-1 (2008); see also Glenn
Reynolds, A Rifle in Every Pot, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16. 2007, at A21 (noting Greenleaf's Ordinance 208).
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Neutral Principlesand ConstitutionalAvoidance

The second lesson is that the unpredictability of state constitutionalism
supports the doctrine of constitutional avoidance. The Supreme Court should
interpret the Constitution only when a more specific directive is unavailable or
inadequate. A state court's adoption of Shelley to hold that a state court cannot
enforce a private agreement under a state DOMA would not be possible if the
Supreme Court had rested its Shelley decision on other grounds.
Shelley's companion case suggested an answer-one found in affirmative
congressional legislation rather than in the broad strokes of equal protection. In
Hurd v. Hodge,141 decided on the same day as Shelley, white residents of the
District of Columbia brought suit to eject blacks who had purchased homes
subject to a racially restrictive covenant. 142 Chief Justice Vinson, writing for the
majority, held that the Civil Rights Act of 1866, rather than the Fifth
Amendment Due Process clause, forbade federal courts from enforcing racially
restrictive covenants-much in the same way the Fourteenth Amendment
prevents state courts from enforcing racially restrictive covenants. 143 While the
Chief Justice avoided the constitutional issue, his solution was wanting in this
respect: rather than find that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 voided the racially
restrictive covenants themselves, 144 he held that the Act was merely a restriction
on their enforceability in federal court. 145 This was an error that was not
corrected until twenty years later in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. 146
This second lesson dovetails with the first, as one way to minimize
problematic state application of Supreme Court principles is to avoid
interpreting the federal constitution until it is necessary.
C.

Neutral Principlesand State Experimentalism

Finally, states must be less cavalier and more deliberative when they amend
their foundational documents. While Justice Brandeis celebrated states as the
"laborator[ies]" of democracy, 147 he also cautioned that "[t]he greatest dangers
to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but
without understanding."'' 48 Too often, the amendments proposed and ratified by

141. 334 U.S. 24 (1948).

142. Hurd, 334 U.S. at 27.
143. Id. at 33-34.
144. See id. at 31 ("[T]he statute does not invalidate private restrictive agreements so long as the
purposes of those agreements are achieved by the parties through voluntary adherence to the terms.").
145. Id. at 34-35; see also Rosen, supra note 36, at 483-98 (detailing alternative proposal for
resolving Shelley).
146. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). For a further discussion of this issue and the history of the Jones
decision, see generally Darrell A.H. Miller, White Cartels, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and the History
of Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 77 FORDHAM L. REV.999 (2008); Rosen, supra note 36, at 487,490.
147. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262,311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
148. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled in
part by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). I do
not mean to suggest that all antigay marriage advocates are "well-meaning." Some, in fact, are simply
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direct democracy are poorly written, badly considered, and heedless of how they
will be analyzed by state courts or interact with other state laws. And, because
they are written into the state constitution, they do not lend themselves to
legislative adjustment. Nevertheless, direct amendment of the state constitution
is revered in popular political culture and enshrined in many state
constitutions. 149 Hence, the solution must lie in judicious use of this procedure.
State legislators, administrators, and electors must be much more cognizant of
the interpretive methodologies their courts use to interpret their founding
150
charters.
The experience of Arizona in the 2006 midterm elections is an object lesson.
The proposed language to be added to the Arizona constitution read as follows:
To preserve and protect marriage in this state, only a union between
one man and one woman shall be valid or recognized as a marriage by
this state or its political subdivisions and no legal status for unmarried
persons shall be created or recognized by this
state or its political
151
subdivisions that is similar to that of marriage.
152
When proposed, initiative backers predicted widespread popular support.
However, a well-financed opposition backed by, among others, elderly retirees,
recognized that its broad provisions could threaten their own benefits. 53 Key to
its defeat was a concerted effort to educate the populace of the potential legal
consequences of the Amendment. 54 A far simpler version of the amendment
passed in November 2008.155

bigoted. However, I would venture a larger proportion of them are not bigoted, but are instead simply
ignorant, unreflective, or lack empathy.
149. I know of no state that has amended its constitution to make it harder to amend the
constitution by direct initiative in the current century, although an effort may be taking place, sub
silentio, to place checks on the process, either judicially through the "one issue" rule or by legislatively
raising the numerical requirement for signatures. My thanks to Professor David Barron for this
information.
150. In this respect, I would agree that state judicial candidates should be permitted to answer
general questions about judicial philosophy. I do not, however, subscribe to the belief that judges
should be permitted to answer questions on discrete topics likely to come before the court. Cf
Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002) (holding that state statute prohibiting
judicial candidates from giving their views on disputed issues violated First Amendment).
151. An Initiative Measure: Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of Arizona; Amending
the Constitution of Arizona; By Adding Article XXX; Relating to the Protection of Marriage,
available at http://www.azsos.gov/election/2006/General/BallotMeasureText/PROP / 010X%2 0(C-022006).pdf.
152. See Elvia Diaz, State Vote Urged on Same-Sex Marriage, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Nov. 9, 2004, at
Al (quoting one initiative backer as saying proposal "has widespread appeal").
153. See Amanda J. Crawford, Consistent Message Doomed Prop. 107, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Nov. 9,
2006, at A21 (noting that opponents of 2006 amendment emphasized ban would "cost some people
health insurance benefits, including straight people"); Amanda J. Crawford, Legislators Push Ban on
Gay Marriage, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Feb. 12, 2008, at Al (noting that 2006 amendment proposed
"block[ing] governments from recognizing any similar relationship to marriage").
154. This effort failed to persuade voters in both Virginia and Ohio.
155. That amendment read: "Only a union of one man and one woman shall be valid or
recognized as a marriage in this state." ARIZ. CONST. art. XXX, § 1.
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In California, attempts to restrain the marriage-defining activities of courts
and legislatures reached the level of the absurd. A proposed California
amendment (subsequently withdrawn from circulation) actually went to the
chromosomal level. The proposed amendment stated:
Only marriage between one man and one woman is valid or recognized
in California, whether contracted in this state or elsewhere. A man is
an adult male human being who possesses at least one inherited Y
chromosome, and a woman is an adult female human being who does
not possess an inherited Y chromosome. Neither the Legislature nor
any court, government institution, government agency, initiative
statute, local government, or government official shall abolish the civil
institution of marriage between one man and one woman, or decrease
statutory rights, incidents, or employee benefits of marriage shared by
one man and one woman, or require private entities to offer or provide
rights, incidents, or benefits of marriage to unmarried individuals, or
bestow statutory rights, incidents, or employee benefits of marriage on
unmarried individuals. Any public act, record, or judicial proceeding,
jurisdiction, that violates this section
from within this state or another
15 6
is void and unenforceable.
This version of California's DOMA ultimately failed to reach the ballot.
Instead, Proposition 8, a much simpler amendment, passed in California by
57
relatively narrow margins.'
Recently, in Colorado, the efforts of a twenty-year-old law school student
resulted in a proposed amendment to the Colorado constitution that would have
defined a fertilized embryo (no matter where its location) as a "person" for
purposes of the due process, equal protection, and "inalienable rights" sections
of the state constitution. 158 Notwithstanding the electoral failure of the so-called
human life amendment, the placement of this measure on the November 2008
ballot seemed utterly heedless of its consequences. 159 For example, could in vitro
fertilization clinics have continued to make multiple embryos for implantation?
Would each of these embryos have claim to all the due process rights accorded

156. Letter from Larry Bowler and Randy Thomasson, VoteYesMarriage.com, to Toni Melton,
Initiative Sec'y, Office of the Attorney Gen., Cal., (Dec. 10, 2007) (on file with author) (emphasis
added). As a couple of my colleagues noted, this proposed definition would have the unintended
consequence of allowing, for example, marriage between a postoperative male-female transsexual and
her female lover. Similarly, some persons who have a condition known as complete androgen
insensitivity carry XY chromosomes, but due to a genetic abnormality, do not process hormones that
create secondary male sex characteristics. These persons have all the physical traits of a female,
including external genitalia, but male chromosomes.
157. Jessica Garrison et al., Voters Approve Proposition 8 Banning Same-Sex Marriages, L.A.
5, 2008, available at http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-gaymarriage5TIMES, Nov.

2008nov05,0,4876367,full.story (stating margin of fifty-two percent to forty-eight percent). This
proposition was subsequently upheld as constitutional in Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 122 (Cal.
2009).
158. Ashley Surdin, Colorado Voters Will Be Asked When 'Personhood' Begins, WASH. POST,
July 13, 2008, at A4.
159. The key spokeswoman for the effort was quoted as saying, "[w]e try not to focus on some of
the issues that will be taken care of later on." Surdin, supra note 158.
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other persons? Would each embryo have been entitled to a guardian ad litem to
decide which one goes into the uterus and which one goes into the freezer?
The breadth of these and similar proposals, enacted by direct initiative with
little of the deliberation or legislative history that we find with the Federal
Constitution, should be a warning to activists, state legislators, state judiciaries,
and the administrative bodies. Each of these entities are stakeholders in the
actual wording of the constitutional amendments and should be more temperate
when called upon to amend and to construe their own constitutional documents.
VI.

CONCLUSION

State DOMAs' latent threat to private ordering may never materialize. It
could be, for instance, that when confronted with the question of whether
judicial enforcement of an agreement between a same-sex couple is state action,
the state court will follow a predicable pattern of precipitously sheering Shelley
off at its facts. 160 In this sense, then, Wechsler's fear that Shelley is really a case
about results rather than reason arguably will have been confirmed.
Or, it could be that state courts will read their state DOMAs as requiring a
Shelley application, but then, like the Colorado Supreme Court did with
Amendment 2, hold that their very own construction of the scope of the state
DOMA is a violation of equal protection; thus completing in one court the
circuit from Shelley to its reverse in Romer.
But, it is equally possible that the state court will use a Shelley-type analysis
to invalidate a private agreement, but hold that Romer does not command an
opposite result-potentially leaving scores of same-sex couples in a legal bind
between private ordering and public enforcement.
And that will be a knot only the United States Supreme Court can cut.

160. See, e.g., MedValUSA Health Programs, Inc. v. MemberWorks, Inc., 872 A.2d 423, 431
(Conn. 2005) (noting that "many commentators speculate that the holding of Shelley has been
effectively confined to its facts").
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Figure A. Mobius strip
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